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LIABILITY oF FEDERAL OFFICERS FOR QuAS1-

J UDlCIAL AcTS -

Plaintiff sought to withdraw a registration statement which
he had filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The commission
denied him the right to do so and applied for a court order to enforce a previously
issued subpoena to compel the plaintiff to appear before it and to produce books
relating to the registration statement. After the Supreme Court had upheld the
plaintiff's right to withdraw the statement,1 he brought an action for damages
against the members of the commission for malicious prosecution, libel and
slander, etc., alleging in addition that the defendants had acted maliciously and
in bad faith. Held, that since the defendants had acted within the scope of their
official duties, they were not liable in an action for damages. Jones v. Kennedy,
{App. D. C. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 40, cert. denied (U.S. 1941) 62 S. Ct. 130.
It is well-settled that where there has been no invasion of property rights,
the erroneous act of a quasi-judicial nature 2 by an administrative officer acting
in good faith within the scope of his official authority 8 does not render him liable

1 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654
(1936).
2 "It [ quasi-judicial power] is a duty conferred by words or by implication upon
an officer to look into facts and to act upon them in the exercise of discretion." People
v. Kuder, 93 Cal. App. 42 at 54-55, 269 P. 198, 630 (1926).
8 Acts are done within the official scope of duty of an administrative officer when
they are "in relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision." Stand-
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for damages to a party injured by his actions.4 The cases are in confusion, however, where the officer has acted in bad faith and with malicious motives. Under
such circumstances, a majority of courts, by dicta at least, hold him answerable
in damages. 5 The federal courts, among others,6 adhere to a contrary view,
holding that regardless of malice or bad faith federal officers exercising discretionary powers of a quasi-judicial nature are not personally liable for activities
within the scope of their official duties, at least where property rights are not
invaded.7 This doctrine had its origin in the decision of Spalding v. Vilas,8 in
which the Supreme Court, relying on cases extending to judges an absolute immunity against suits even for conduct actuated by malice, held that a member of
the President's cabinet was absolutely immune to damage actions for official
communications within the scope of his authority. 9 Such a decision might be
explained in terms of the especial dignity of their positions attaching to the
highest executive officers of the federal government.10 Moreover, a subsequent
case granting absolute immunity to a federal prosecuting attorney may be explained because of his close connection with the judicial function. 11 Other
cases, however, definitely show the emergence of a rule extending to various
minor federal administrative officers exercising discretionary capacities complete
immunity for acts within the line of their duties.12 Such a rule should, it seems,
ard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, (App. D. C. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 557 at 559. Or
when they have "more or less connection with the general matters committed by law
to his control or supervision." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 at 498, 16 S. Ct. 631
(1896).
4
MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS 421 (1890); Wallace v. Feehan, 206
Ind. 522, 190 N. E. 438 (1934); Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P. (2d)
1085 (1935); People v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. (2d) 409, 108 P.
(2d) 923 (1940); Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S. E. (2d) 423
(1941).
5
State v. Conley, 118 W. Va. 508, 190 S. E. 908 (1937); Richter v. Harris,
62 Ga. App. 64, 7 S. E. (2d) 432 (1940); Speyer v. School District No. 1, 82 Colo.
534, 261 P. 859 (1927).
6
See Wright v. White, (Ore. 1941) 110 P. (2d) 948; Wasserman v. City of
Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N. W. 857 (1935); Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159,
131 A. 155 (1926).
7
Cooper v. O'Connor, {App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135; Block v. Sassaman,
(D. C. Minn. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 105; United States to use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, (App. D. C. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 383; Yaselli v. Goff, (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) 12
F. {2d) 396; Lang v. Wood, (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 211.
8
161 U.S. 483, 16 S. Ct. 631 (1896).
9
See also Glass v. Ickes, (App. D. C. 1940) 117 F. (2d) 273; Standard Nut
Margarine Co. v. Mellon, (App. D. C. 1934) 72 F. (2d) 557.
10
Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. REv. 263
at 274 (1937).
11
Yaselli v. Goff, (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396.
12
Thus, for example, absolute immunity was accorded to the Comptroller and
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency, a receiver of a national bank, and a special agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Cooper v. O'Connor, {App. D. C. 1938)
99 F. (2d) 135; to members of the.United States Parole Board, a warden of a federal
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have a salutary effect on the discharge of public duties by officers charged with
discretionary powers. They can carry out completely and impartially the duties
assigned to them without fear of liability to a public too often ready to impugn
the motives of officers in the discharge of their duties. 13 There is, of course,
much to be said for the contrary point of view which seeks to protect the individual from oppressive and unwarranted official action, and even the federal
courts have expressed uneasiness over allowing officials, particularly those in a
minor capacity, to exercise unbridled power, subject only to checks political in
nature.14 Considerations of public policy in favor of the "fearless and effective
administration of the law" 15 must be balanced against concern for the individual
injured by the impact of official action on his private rights.16

Arthur M. Hojfeins

penitentiary, the director of prisons, and a parole executive in Lang v. Wood, (App.
D. C. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 21 l; to executives of the Work Progress Administration in
Block v. Sassaman, (D. C. Minn. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 105; to a United States consul in
United States to use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, (App. D. C. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 383.
In the principal case the plaintiff made only general allegations of malice on the part
of the defendants, specific allegations being made against employees of the commission
who were not served with process; however, in the light of past holdings, there seems
little doubt but that the court would have decided the same way even if actual malice
had been proved.
111 In many instances the motives of the moving party may very well be fully as
malicious as those which he attributes to the officer sued. See MECHEM, PUBLIC
OFFICES AND OFFICERS 405 ( I 890).
14 See Cooper v. O'Connor, (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135 at 142.
15 Id. 137.
16 ln certain situations the injured individual, if he acts quickly enough, may not
be left entirely remediless. He might perhaps prevent the injury by the use of
mandamus or injunction. See 34 MICH. L. REv. II3 at II4 (1935).

